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MIAMI LAW QUARITERLY
mailed to plaintiff. The case follows the authority of a previous New Jersey
case which denied workmen's compensation because the only available evi-
dence was hearsay, thus denying the right of the workman's beneficiary. 4
Perhaps a better rule in cases of this type would permit reliance on sub-
stantial hearsay when legally competent evidence is not available.'5  By
requiring agencies to follow outmoded rules of evidence, justice is often de-
nied, especially in workmen's compensation cases. Administrative findings
should be permitted on reliable, trustworthy evidence, regardless of technical
common law admissibility.'
William A. Ingraham
COURTS-CIRCUIT JUDGES-EFFECT OF :RROR IN
EN BANC PROCEEDINGS
The defendant circuit judge issued a search warrant and pursuant to
statutory provisions,' appointed an elisor to serve it. The plaintiff sheriff
filed a declaratory bill and requested the circuit, excepting the defendant, 2
to hear the cause en bane. The senior Judge3 then assigned the cause to five
judges within the circuit. One of the judges recused himself, convinced an
en bane proceeding would be contrary to law and result in reversible error.
The recusant then asserted that the judgment of one circuit judge is the
determination of the judicial circuit under the Florida Constitution.4
Sullivan v. Milledge, 2 Fla. Supp. 125 (lth Cir. Ct. 1949).
Where the constitution provides for more than one judge in a particular
circuit," the questions to be resolved are:
1. Is it reversible error, under existing law, and in the disposition
14.Andricsak v. National Fireproofing Corp., 3 N.J. 466, 70 A.2d 750 (1950).
I5. See NLRB v. Remington Rand, 94 F.2d 862, 873 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 304
U.S. 576 (1938).
16. 1 V MORE, EviDENCE 41-42 (3d ed. 1940) (residuum rule is not wise and
satisfactory for general adoption).
1. FLA. STAT. § 47.12 (1951) .... A justice of the peace or a constable, in the
respective counties, may serve all process in cases where the sheriff is interested, and in
cases of necessity the judge of the circuit court may appoint an elisor to act instead of
the sheriff.
2. Since the conflict arpsc between the sheriff and defendant Circuit Judge, plaintiff
felt said Judge ought to be excepted.
3. FLA. CONST. Art. 5, § 43. . . . Wherever there are two or more Circuit Judges
appointed for a Circuit the business may be divided among the Circuit Judges . . . as may
be prescribed by law, and where no provision has been made by law, the distribution of
the business of the Circuit between the Circuit Judges of the Circuit, . . . and the allot-
ment or assignment of matters and cases to he heard, decided, ordered, tried, decreed or
adjudged, shall be controlled or made when necessary by the Circuit Judge holding the
commission earliest in date ...
4. FLA. CONST. Art. 5, § 43. The Legislature may from time to time . . . provide
for the appointment of one or more additional Circuit Judges for such Circuit. . . . He
shall have all the powers and perform all the duties that are or may be provided or pre-
scribed by the Constitution or by statute . . . and all statutes concerning Circuit Judges
shall apply to him.
5. Ibid. State ex Tel. Palmer v. Atkinson, 116 Fla. 366, 156 So. 726 (1934).
CASES NOTED
of ordinary litigation, to participate en bane in the adjudica-
tion of an issue?
2. Is it contrary to law to sit en bane when such determination
affects the rights and powers of the judicial circuit itself,
rather than the rights and interests of litigants before the
court?
The plaintiff sheriff contended that the judgment rendered would be the
effective determination of the court in toto rather than the decision of an
individual judge. The sheriff argued an en bane proceeding would be more
authoritatively treated by the entire circuit. However, the Florida courts
have decreed otherwise. As early as 1931 it was held that a single judge
constitutes a circuit court. In the event there is more than one judge within
the circuit, each judge is vested with power to exercise all the authority of
the judicial circuit,7 in the absence of controlling organic or statutory provi-
sions.8 The Florida Supreme Court held the action of a circuit judge is the
action of the circuit court." The court is an entity. Its separation is purely
fictional10 being for convenience and practicality only.
In the interpretation of the Illinois Constitution," ahnost identical to
Florida's, it was held that it is error for more than one judge to preside or
participate jointly in a given case. 12 Each judge, alone and independent of
the others, should perform all the functions and discharge all the duties im-
posed on the circuit by the Constitution 1" or statute. It is not a group
office; the judges "... cannot and do not act jointly . . ."14 The deter-
mination of one judge is the determination of the circuit. The Illinois
court indicated that if it were contemplated that a majority of the judges
should sit en bane, the drafters of the constitution would have so provided; if
it were intended that a certain number constitute a quorum, they would have
again so provided, as they did for the Supreme Court.'5
It is only with reference to the second stated question that Pennsylvania
courts differ from the Illinois position. For the Common Pleas Courts of
Pennsylvania, an equivalent of the Florida Circuit Court, it was held that
in most matters the judgment of a single judge is the determination of the
court. 16 The court was defined as a tribunal, officially assembled under
authority of law, whereas a judge is simply an officer or member of that
tribunal. 7 A distinction was made between the powers and duties of a
6. Meyer v. Nator Holding Co., 102 Fla. 689, 136 So. 636 (1931).
7. United American Ins. Co. v. Oak, 123 Fla. 159, 166 So. 547 (1936).
8. City of Coral Gables v. Blount, 131 Fla. 36, 178 So. 554 (1938).
9. State ex rel Brooks v. Freeland, 103 Fla. 663, 138 So. 27 (1931).
10. Peterson v. Spnakman, 49 Ariz. 342, 66 P.2d 1023 (1937).
11. ILL. CONST. Art. VI, § 23.
12. Wayland v. City of Chicago, 369 111. 43, 15 N.E.2d 516 (1938); Courson v.
Browning, 78 Ill. 208 (1875); Hall v. Hamilton, 74 111. 437 (1874).
13. ILL. CoNsT. Art. VI, 23.
14. People ex rel Jonas v. Schlaeger, 381 I11. 146, 45 N.E.2d 30, 35 (1942).
15. Harvey v. Van De Mark, 71 Il. 117 (1873); Jonas v. Albee, 70 II1. 34 (1873).
16. In re Hanover Township School Directors, 290 Pa. 95, 137 At. 811 (1927).
17. Carter's Estate, 254 Pa. 518, 99 Atl. 58 (1916).
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court, and the functions of a judge. Whether an act is to be performed by
the court or the judge is generally determined by the character of the act.
Whenever it is a statutory power or duty conferred upon the court, it can
only be discharged by the assembled tribunal, "however composed, whether
of one judge or several." Is The power of removal or appointment of school
directors,' 9 public officials,20 and guardians, is conferred upon the court and
"court" means court en bane.
21
The Pennsylvania position seems the more reasonable in differentiating
the stated questions. It is highly improbable that the drafters of the Florida
Constitution intended to have the opinion of one circuit judge bind the full
circuit in the interpretation of constitutional and statutory powers conferred
on that circuit. Such a conclusion would be illogical in that the minority
opinion of one, asserted first, could prevail. This would be especially true
if the remaining judges not participating, were to have a contrary opinion.
Certainly this question is important enough to have merited a discussion in
the majority opinion.
Arthur J. Franza
COURTS - JUDICIAL IMMUNITY VS. CIVIL RIGHTS
Plaintiff, confined as a delinquent t on an order issued without notice
or hearing in violation of his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment,
brought an action by virtue of the Civil Rights Act' against the judge who
promulgated the order. Held, the judicial immunity of a judge acting
within his authority is not derogated by the Civil Rights Act. Francis v.
Lyman, 108 F. Supp. 884 (D. Mass. 1952).
The principle that exempts judges from civil liability for acts in the
exercise of their judicial functions has "a deep root in the common law." 3
Judges are not civilly liable when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, 4
18. Moritz v. Luzerne County Co., 283 Pa. 349, 352, 129 Ati. 85, 86 (1925).
19. In re tIanover Township School Directors, 290 Pa. 95, 137 Atl. 811 (1927).
20. Novak v. Koprivsek, 58 York 16, 29 North 201 (1944).
21. Carter's Estate, 254 Pa. 518, 99 Atl. 58 (1916).
1. MAss. GEN. LAWS C. 123, § 116 (19325.
2. REV. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 8 U.S.G. § 43 (1946) "Every person who, under
color of any statute . . . of any State . . . subjects . . . any citizen of the U. S. . . . to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law . . . for redress."
3. Yates v. Lansing, 5 Johns. 282, 291 (N.Y. 1810); Bradley v. Fisher. 13 Wall.
335 (U.S. 1871); Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396 (2nd Cir. 1926), aofd, 275 U.S. 503
(1927); Allen v. Biggs, 62 F. Supp. 229 (E.D. Pa. 1945); Allard v. Estes, 292 Mass.
187, 197 N.E. 884 (1935); Landscidel v. Culernan, 47 N.D. 275, 181 N.W. 593 (19211;
Hammond v. Howell, 2 Mod. 218, 86 Eng. Rep. 1035 (1678); 2 COOLEY, Tors 420
et. seq. (4th ed. 1932).
4. As distinguished from acts where no jurisdiction over the subject matter exists.
Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (U.S. 1871); Randell v. Brigham, 7 Wall. 523 (U.S.
1868); Allard v. Estes, 292 Mass. 187, 197 N.E. 884 (1935).
